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There is currently no consensus regarding the effect of unions on technology. We apply meta-
regression analysis to the extant econometric studies and find that unions depress investment 
in  new  technology.  However,  this  adverse  effect  has  been  declining  over  time  and  is 
moderated by country differences in industrial relations and regulations: The adverse effect 
appears  to  increase  with  labor  market  flexibility.  Unions  also  have  an  adverse  effect  on 
technology adoption. The paper considers both the direct and indirect effects of unions and 
shows that their effect on technology is larger than their effect on profitability and physical 
capital. The  size of the union effect on technology  is compared to the effects of human 
capital, industry concentration, firm size, growth, profitability, and physical capital.  
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“... cross-country differences in the R&D impact of unions could represent either unsolved 
econometrics problems or genuine institutional differences between nations in union attitudes 
and ability to bargain. We suspect the latter is the main reason.” 
              Lommerud et al. (2006, p. 21) 
 
“At the very least the technological revolutions in the US would have been seriously impeded 
if the labor market environment would have been more like in Europe, namely with stronger 
unions and with more regulation.” 
Alesina and Zeira (2006, p. 5) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Intangible forms of capital, such as knowledge and R&D, are widely deemed to be significant 
drivers of economic growth and cross-country differences in incomes (Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil, 1992;  Lederman and  Maloney, 2003; OECD, 2008). Technology also shapes  labor 
market  outcomes,  such  as  unemployment  and  the  returns  to  skill.  Consequently,  much 
research has been directed to identifying the determinants of innovation and the adoption of 
new technology.   
One important line of research is the effects of industrial relations and unions on inter-
firm and inter-industry differences in innovation (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Addison and 
Hirsch, 1989; and Hirsch 1991).
1  This literature currently consists of 38 econometric studies 
(see section 3 below) and a very large number of case studies. There is much ambiguity about 
the effects of unions on innovation and relatively little is known about their effects outside 
the US and the UK.  Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (1998a, p. 929) note that there is: 
“still relatively  little empirical work on the  important issue of the effect of  labor market 
                                                 
1  In  this  paper  we  abstract  from  macroeconomic  performance  issues.  See  Flanagan  (1999)  and  Storm and 
Naastepad (2009) for reviews of this parallel literature.    2
institutions  on  growth  and  R&D.”  Unfortunately,  the  comparatively  poor  availability  of 
unionization, R&D, and innovation data, means that the supply of new studies will be rather 
limited,  making  it  imperative  to  draw  as  much  information  as  possible  from  the  extant 
evidence. 
This paper offers the first quantitative research synthesis of the literature through a 
systematic  review,  or  meta-regression  analysis  (MRA),  of  the  evidence  (Stanley,  2001; 
Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). Our MRA has three aims. First, we wish to provide a statistical 
integration  of  the  existing  empirical  studies  on  the  net  impact  of  unions  on  innovation 
(hereafter the U-I effect) and the adoption of technology (U-A effect), with a view to quantify 
the magnitude of these associations: Are these effects negative, positive, or neutral? Is the 
size of the U-I and U-A effect of practical significance?
2 Our second aim is to test whether 
there are observable differences in the effects of unions between countries and over time. We 
are especially interested in exploring the extent to which the differences in findings can be 
explained by country differences in regulations: Is U-I larger when labor markets are flexible 
or regulated? What is the effect of trade liberalization? Our third aim is to identify the sources 
of  differences  in  reported  effects  between  studies.  For  example,  how  important  are 
differences  in  econometric  specification  and  the  measurement  of  innovation  and 
unionization? 
Our MRA is not a substitute for the existing reviews. Rather it revisits the issues using 
a  different,  and  statistically  based,  methodology.  We  draw  inferences  from  two  sets  of 
empirical studies. First, we analyze the partial correlations and elasticities between unions 
and  innovation  (U-I)  from  29  econometric  studies  that  report  208  estimates.  Second,  we 
                                                 
2  Our  focus  here  is  only  on  the  effects  of  unions  on technology  rather than the reverse  causality:  Unions 
themselves might be affected by technological change.  
 
   3
analyze the marginal effects from nine probit studies that report 51 estimates of the U-A 
effect. The first group of studies analyzes the effects of unions on innovation (using measures 
of  R&D  or  counts  of  the  number  of  innovations),  while  the  second  group  looks  at  the 
adoption of technological change. By drawing upon this diverse evidence, we are able to 
comprehensively analyze the effects of unions on technology and are also able to compare the 
union effect across industries, countries, and over time. 
The paper is set out as follows. The theoretical background is reviewed briefly in 
section 2. The data used in the MRA are discussed in section 3. In section 4 we apply MRA 
to  quantify  the  direct  effects  of  unions  on  technology.  Section  5  investigates  the 
heterogeneity in the reported U-I and U-A effects. Section 6 explores the relative importance 
of unions by comparing their effect to six other determinants of innovation: Human capital, 
industry concentration,  firm size, growth, profitability, and physical capital.  We then use 
some of this information to estimate the indirect effects of unions on innovation. The paper is 
concluded in section 7. 
 
2.  Theoretical Considerations 
Excellent reviews of the theoretical arguments can be found in Booth (1995), Menezes-Filho 
and Van Reenen (2003), and Hirsch (2007). Here we present only a summary of the main 
arguments.   
There are several dimensions to the effects of unions on innovation and technology. 
Unions  can  affect  the  level  of  investment  in  R&D,  which  in  turn  can  affect  the  rate  of 
innovation. Unions can affect the adoption of technological change in the workplace and, 
hence, productivity growth. Unions can affect the firm’s ability to gain fully from the benefits 
of new technology, and where projects vary in the degree to which they are vulnerable to rent 
appropriation, unions might affect the type of investment project undertaken (Schnabel and   4
Wagner, 1992b). Our focus in this paper is on the first two dimensions, as they have drawn 
most of the attention in the empirical literature. 
As in many areas of labor economics and industrial relations, there are competing and 
contrasting  views  on  the  effect  of  unions  on  technology.  Several  perspectives  can  be 
identified. 
A tax on capital and labor monopoly: Union wage demands can serve as a tax on 
labor,  with  an  uncertain  impact  on  investment  (Denny  and  Nickell,  1991,  1992;  Hirsch, 
1991). On the one hand, they raise production costs reducing the optimal level of output and, 
hence, reducing capital requirements. Lower profits also make it more difficult to finance 
new investment. On the other hand, higher wages are an incentive to substitute labor with the 
relatively cheaper capital. There are also non-wage effects. For example, restrictive work 
practices and resistance to the introduction of new technology increase the cost of investing 
in  both tangible and  intangible assets. Unions can devote their  monopoly power to rent-
seeking,  capturing  some  of  the  firm’s  quasi-rents  from  long  lived  investments.  This 
discourages investment and decreases dynamic efficiency (see Grout, 1984; Hirsch and Link, 
1984; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1990).  
Collective Voices: Freeman and Medoff (1984) argued that unions have two faces – 
the  labor  monopoly  and  the  collective  voices  aspect.  Unions  might  be  receptive  to 
organizational change, creating a climate conducive to investment, and they  may  help to 
retain highly trained staff who can contribute to innovation. Unions may also enable firms to 
increase the speed of diffusion of technology and, hence, increase the firm’s incentive to 
invest  (see  Menezes-Filho  et  al,  1998b).  Higher  levels  of  productivity  (static  efficiency) 
resulting from unionization might increase the attractiveness of investment. Hence, the net 
effect on investment in intangible assets might be positive.   5
Bargaining:  The disincentive effects on investment may disappear with ‘efficient’ 
bargains, where unions bargain over wages and other aspects of the employment relationship, 
(see Menezes-Filho et al, 1998b). In a series of papers, Ulph and Ulph (1989, 1994 and 1998) 
focus  on  the  strategic  aspects  of  R&D  rivalry  between  firms  and  argue  that  technology 
outcomes depend on the form of bargains (e.g. right-to-manage versus efficient bargaining) 
and union preferences for employment and wages. Depending on the competitive setting, it is 
possible that stronger unions cause firms to increase innovation. Tauman and Weiss (1987) 
show that unionized firms might adopt labor-saving technologies, especially if wages and 
technology are simultaneously determined and product demand is high. 
In practice, firms usually have the prerogative to decide what technology to adopt, 
when to adopt it, the purpose to which it is to be used and who shall use it. Negotiations with 
unions often occur after these decisions have already been made.
3 Unions might be involved 
in negotiations prior to key technology decisions being made, but this in itself does not mean 
that technology choices will be affected: Union preferences need not prevail. In this case, the 
effect on technology  is  likely to be  neutral. Unions  might embrace technological change 
purely because they realize that they have no choice – resistance might be useless. On the 
other hand, even if there is no formal negotiation, it is possible that union preferences might 
shape management preferences. This would make it difficult to econometrically identify the 
effects of unions. 
Are unions necessarily hostile to new technology? Union attitudes to technology are 
shaped by many factors, especially the structure and organization of unions,
4 their bargaining 
                                                 
3 For example, firms in the US are not required to bargain over the introduction of new technology, but they are 
required to bargain over the effects of technological change (Abraham and Finzel, 1997). 
4  For  example,  industrial  unions  may  find  that  technological  change  affects  only  a  small  fraction  of  their 
membership or that it affects different parts of the union in different ways (e.g. hurts some members but benefits 
many others) so that the union does not oppose the change. In contrast, craft unions maybe more exposed and 
resist technological change. This distinction is rarely made in the econometric studies.   6
strength, the form that bargaining takes, the nature of product market competition, and the 
nature  of  the  technological  change  itself.  Two  major  issues  for  unions  are  the  effect  of 
technology on employment (and, hence, union membership) and the pace of work.
5 Unions 
often seek to prevent or limit employment displacement. Technology’s effect on employment 
depends, in part, on the elasticity of the demand for labor.
6 Events that reduce this elasticity 
might trigger union opposition, e.g. trade liberalization (Lommerud et al., 2006).
7 
Dowrick and Spencer (1994, p. 50) argue that there is: “no systematic relationship 
between  union  bargaining  strength  and  union  attitudes  to  innovation.  Rather,  it  is  the 
structure  of  union  organization  and  the  underlying  preferences  toward  wages  and 
employment  that  is  important.”  They  also  argue  that  the  relationship  might  be  non-
monotonic, with high levels of innovation associated with firm-level unions and then again 
with peak union bodies that take a more global view, while  industry unions  might resist 
innovation  (see also Haucap and Wey, 2004, for a similar story). Calabuig and Gonzalez-
Maestre  (2002)  argue that  higher  levels  of  union  centralization  can  stimulate  innovation, 
especially if innovation is sufficiently drastic. 
All  these  varying  model  predictions  indicate  that  the  net  impact  of  unions  is 
theoretically  unclear.  Hence,  empirical  investigations  are  essential.  Unfortunately, 
econometric studies  have produced a wide variation of results (reviewed  below) and this 
variation  is  rather  difficult  to  digest  using  the  framework  of  a  traditional  review.  Prior 
reviews of the empirical literature have in general concluded that U-I is negative in the US 
                                                 
5 The effect on skills can also be of concern.  
6 Our focus here is at the firm and industry level. At the macroeconomic level, technology and new markets can 
create millions of new jobs. See Hornstein et al. (2007) on how the interaction between labor market institutions 
and technological change can shape the demand for labor. 
7 Lommerud et al.,( 2006) argue that trade liberalization increases union opposition to technology  when it 
decreases  the  elasticity  of  labor  demand  and  when  there  exists  a  larger  home  market  and  a  technological 
advantage.   7
but not necessarily elsewhere. According to Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen (1998b, p. 
46): “There is as much evidence of a positive correlation as of a negative one”. 
Several moderating factors might explain the wide variation in empirical findings. 
One potential contextual factor is the environment in which unionization has been examined. 
The effect of unions may depend, at least in part, on the research setting (industry, country 
and time period) in which unions are investigated. Further, industrial relations systems and 
regulatory regimes vary from one country to another. Measurement differences are another 
methodological feature that might moderate U-I findings. There are several ways in which 
technological  change  and  innovation  can  be  measured,  such  as  investment  in  R&D,  the 
number of patents and innovations, and the number of employees involved.  
 It is possible that this wide range of operational definitions and contextual differences 
contributes to the variation in estimates of the effects of unions on innovation. In this paper 
we use meta-regression analysis to explore whether there are differences between industries, 





3.1  Search criteria 
The  first  step  in  the  meta-analysis  was  to  identify  the  relevant  studies.  We  conducted  a 
comprehensive  search  for  comparable  empirical  studies  using  numerous  search  engines, 
including EconLit and Google Scholar. We also pursued references cited in the empirical 
studies themselves, as well as the existing literature reviews. We restricted our search to the 
published  literature  (book  chapters  and  journals)  in  the  areas  of  economics,  industrial 
organization, industrial relations, and management. We excluded unpublished dissertations, 
                                                 
8 All the data used in this paper are available from the authors.   8
manuscripts  and  working  papers.  The  search  focused  on  studies  published  in  English  or 
French.
9 This extensive literature search identified more than 60 articles and book chapters. 
However, many of these studies were not appropriate for the MRA. We eliminated literature 
reviews  and  studies  that  did  not  provide  original  empirical  analysis.  We  also  eliminated 
several studies where unions were included as a control variable but where key results, such 
as a t-statistic or a coefficient and its standard error, or marginal effects were not reported 
(e.g. Chennels and Van Reenen, 1997). Those studies that involve the same author(s) and 
used the same data were combined together (e.g. Acs and Audretsch, 1987, 1988; Addison 
and Wagner, 1994a, 1994b; Schnabel and Wagner, 1992a, 1992b; and Menezes-Filho et al., 
1998a, 1998b). From this process of  literature search  and elimination, we arrived at two 
groups of studies.
10  
The main group consists of 29 studies that estimate the U-I effect and a second group 
consisting  of  nine  studies  that  estimate  the  U-A  effect.
11  Some  studies  include  a  single 
estimate while others report several estimates. For the first group of studies, we have 208 
comparable estimates of the effect of unions on innovation, while the second group reports 51 
estimates. These are the population of estimates that meet our search criteria and they are the 
data we use for the MRA.
12   
The second step in the MRA is the computation of an effect size for each study. As 
recommended by Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Doucouliagos and Laroche (2009), we use 
                                                 
9 The search for studies ended 30th June 2010. 
10 Our list of econometric studies is similar to that used by other reviewers, most notably Menezes-Filho and 
Van Reenen (2003). We include some newer studies not included in their review and exclude some studies for 
which it was not possible to calculate a partial correlation or a marginal effect.  
11 Note that there are several other binary studies available. However, we were unable to include these in the 
MRA because we were unable to calculate marginal effects, e.g. Benvignati (1982). 
12 New technology is often embedded within physical stock (equipment and buildings). However, except for 
section 6.1 below, we ignore the effects of unions on physical investment in this paper. See Hornstein, Krusell 
and Violante (2007) for analysis of capital-embodied technical change. 
   9
the partial correlation for those estimates using continuous measures of innovation. Partial 
correlations measure the strength of the association between unions and innovation, holding 
all other factors constant. They are directly comparable between and within studies. Partial 
correlations can be combined to estimate the overall average effect size of unions, as well as 
the average effect for individual countries and time periods. We use the marginal effect for 
those estimates that use a binary measure of technology adoption: This was either reported in 
studies or we calculated it directly from information provided in the study.  
The studies included in the MRA are listed in Appendix A, together with the country 
investigated, the  measure of  innovation, the average sample size, and the average partial 
correlation (or marginal effect). Of the 208 reported partial correlations, 58 percent use US 
data  and  most  (64  percent)  analyze  manufacturing.  The  most  common  measure  of 
unionization is union density, while the most common measure of innovation is R&D as a 
ratio to output (or sales). Of the 208 partial correlations, 47 percent of the reported estimates 
were of negative U-I effects that were also statistically significant. A further 28 percent were 
of negative U-I effects that were not statistically significant. Only ten percent of the estimates 
found  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  effect.  With  less  than  half  of  the  estimates 
reporting  statistically  significant  negative  coefficients,  it  is  tempting  to  conclude  that the 
evidence is weak. However, it is well known that sampling error can distort inferences drawn 
from individual studies (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Kulinskaya, Morgenthaler and Staudte, 
2008). Hence, it is important to draw inferences from the accumulated evidence from all 
comparable  studies  combined.  By  combining  the  evidence  from  numerous  studies,  meta-
analysis increases statistical power.  
Most of the studies were published in the 1980s and the 1990s, while the most recent 
was  published  in  2009.  While  this  literature  does  not  appear to  be  attracting  many  new 
datasets and studies, it nevertheless continues to be an important body of research. First, it is   10
an important part of the literature on the economic effects of unions: “What do unions do?” 
Unions  affect  physical  capital,  productivity,  productivity  growth,  and  profitability.  Their 
effect on innovation is a major part of this configuration of effects. Second, the effect of 
unions on innovation is important to understanding technology as an endogenous process 
arising from conscious decisions made by various institutions. Third, it is an important part of 
the literature that explores the effects of labor market regulations on productivity growth. 
Fourth, investment in intangible capital and innovation are now arguably more important than 
they have been in the past. Understanding the factors that obstruct or facilitate innovation is 
important for policy makers and firms. Hence, it is important to be clear regarding the effects 
of  unions  on  innovation.  This  is  particular  important  as  most  econometric  studies  on 
technology do not consider the effects of industrial relations. If industrial relations play a 
role, then these studies might be mis-specified. 
 
3.2  Comparability of estimates 
An important consideration in any review of a literature is the comparability of the 
studies evaluated. Of particular interest is whether the quality of studies differs significantly 
and, hence, whether it is meaningful to combine studies. We do not believe that this is a 
problem for this literature. The majority (86%) of the studies have been published in highly 
regarded journals, such as Industrial Relations, the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
the Review of Economics and Statistics, the Economic Journal, and the European Economic 
Review. Hence, we do not believe that any of the studies warrant exclusion from the database. 
To test this formally, we regress the precision (the inverse of the standard error) of each 
estimate against a constant and the Journal Impact Factor (from the 2007 Social Science   11
Citation  Index).
13  If  the  coefficient  on  the  Impact  Factor  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant, it would indicate that higher ranked journals (in terms of their Impact Factor) 
report estimates with greater precision and, hence, that the studies should not be combined.  
This test indicates no association between precision and journal quality (coefficient = -0.925, 
with a t-statistic of -0.28). Thus, for our data, there is no difference in statistical precision on 
the  basis  of  journal  quality.  Hence,  we  conclude  that  we  can  meaningfully  combine the 
studies. 
In any case, in the MRA we do not assign equal weights to all observations. Instead, 
we employ ‘optimal weighs’ and weigh each estimate by the inverse of its variance (Hedges 
and Olkin, 1985). This means that more precise estimates are given a greater weight. 
Since the estimates were chosen to all be directly comparable across studies, they can 
be pooled together. We calculate three sets of averages for the pooled data. First, we calculate 
un-weighted averages for each country (see Table 1). Second, we apply MRA by regressing 
the partial correlations (or the marginal effects from the probit group of studies) upon a set of 
country  dummy  variables  (see  Table  1).  These  averages  are  unconditional  because  they 
abstract from data, measurement and specification differences between studies and estimates. 
Third, we use MRA to estimate conditional averages that control for country, time period, 
data, specification and measurement differences (see Table 2). We rely on these conditional 




                                                 
13 Obviously, other rankings of journals can be used. However, Impact Factors are highly correlated with these. 
For example, the first order correlation between Impact Factors and the Kalaitzidakis, Stengos and Mamuneas’ 
(2003) – KMS - rankings is 0.74 for the studies included in our MRA. That is, higher KMS ranked journals have 
higher Impact Factors.   12
4.  The Unconditional Average Union-Innovation Effect 
Figure 1 is a funnel plot showing the association between estimated U-I partial correlations 
and their estimated precision, measured here as the inverse of the estimate’s (union effect’s) 
standard error (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010).
14 The funnel plot illustrates the distribution 
of  the  U-I  estimates  showing  that  most  partial  correlations  are  negative.  The  continuous 
vertical line illustrates the position of the weighted average partial correlation of -0.09 (using 
precision to weigh each estimate), while the dotted vertical line shows the position of a zero 
partial correlation. The funnel plot appears to be fairly symmetrically distributed, around the 
precision weighted average. Symmetrical funnel plots suggest that an empirical literature is 
free of publication selection bias. This feature is important because selection bias has been 
shown to be a serious obstacle to statistical inference: If it is sufficiently large, selection bias 
can  significantly  magnify  the  association  between  two  variables  and  distort  statistical 
inference (see Stanley, 2005 and 2008). The funnel plot suggests that the U-I literature is 
relatively free of any such distortion. 
Nearly two-thirds of the estimates use US data (58%), compared to 26% for the UK, 
9% for Germany and 7% for Canada. Figure 2 presents the funnel plot for US estimates. For 
the US, the distribution of the results is similar to that shown in Figure 1, but with fewer 
positive correlations. The weighted average correlation for the US is -0.14. Figure 3 presents 
the  funnel  plot  for  non-US  estimates,  which  have  a  weighted  average  of  only  +0.01, 
suggesting no effect on innovation.  
 
 
FIGURES 1, 2, and 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
14 The figure draws its name from the expected ‘funnel’ shape: Econometric estimates should be symmetrically 
centred around the ‘true’ effect, which is more closely approximated by the more precise estimates (those at the 
top of the funnel), with the less precise estimates distributed on either side of the ‘true’ effect forming the 
funnel.  The concept can be extended to allow a distribution of ‘true effects’, or genuine heterogeneity (see 




The symmetrical appearance of the funnel plots is confirmed by formal statistical tests. We 
use the Funnel Asymmetry Test - Precision Effect Test (FAT-PET) test proposed by Stanley 
(2008). This is a test for the expected non-existence of an association between standard errors 
and the size of the U-I (or U-A) effect, if researchers do not strive to report statistically 
significant effects. In contrast, if publication is biased in favor of statistical significance, then 
researchers  will  re-estimate  their  models  until  they  get  a  ‘desired’  result.  Thus,  the  test 
involves regression the U-I partial correlations upon a constant and the standard error of U-I 
effects.
15 The test results are available from the authors and show that there is no statistical 
evidence of publication selection bias in this literature.
16 
17 Below we report multivariate 
versions of this test which reveals a small degree of selection bias that is of little consequence 
for inference. 
 
4.1   Unions and innovation 
Table 1 reports the un-weighted and MRA weighted averages for the USA, the UK, 
Germany, and Canada. It is important to note that Table 1 ignores all other aspects of study 
design, other than the country of origin of the data. Column 1 reports un-weighted averages 
for each country separately. This is the raw average of reported results that does not take into 
account  the  fact  that  the  precision  of  the  estimates  varies.  Column  2  reports  the  MRA 
weighted results pooling all estimates together and using country dummies to identify country 
differences. Precision is used to assign weights to individual estimates. In case there are any 
                                                 
15 For full details and the logic behind the test, see Stanley (2005) and (2008). 
16 For both the U-I and U-A effects, the coefficient for selection bias is statistically insignificant, with p-values 
of 0.97 and 0.12, respectively. 
17 The finding of no publication selection bias differs sharply to what has been found for most other areas of 
empirical economics (see Roberts and Stanley, 2005).   14
country  specific  selection  biases,  we  include  also  the  standard  error  as  an  explanatory 
variable in the MRA, as recommended by Stanley (2008). Column 2 shows that abstracting 
from measurement and specification differences, the average U-I effect is negative in the US 
and Canada, but is positive in the UK and Germany.
18  In section 5 below, we analyze the U-I 
effect within a multivariate framework controlling for various study differences. 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
4.2  Technology Adoption Studies 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 report the average marginal effect from the nine probit studies 
for which we were able to calculate marginal effects. As we were unable to derive standard 
errors for many of the marginal effects, we used the square root of the sample size as a proxy 
for precision. When all 51 estimates are pooled together, the simple un-weighted average 
marginal effect is +0.014 (t-statistic = 0.82) and the equivalent weighted average marginal 
effect is -0.004 (t-statistic = -0.67). In columns 3 and 4 we split the data into countries. The 
average marginal effect is small and negative for the US. There is a small positive effect for 
the  UK,  but  the  level  of  statistical  significance  is  weak.  The  insignificant  dummy  for 
Australia means that the average marginal effect in Australia does not differ from the average 
marginal effect in the US.  
 
                                                 
18 The coefficient for Canada is not statistically significant in column 2. This means that Canada is not different 
to the base, which is the US. The MRA coefficient for the UK is +0.16, while the coefficient for the base (the 
US) is -0.14. Hence, the U-I effect for the UK is +0.02. Similarly, the MRA coefficient for Germany is +0.20. 
Hence, the U-I for Germany is +0.06.   15
5.  Explaining heterogeneity 
The averages reported in Table 1 ignore the obvious heterogeneity displayed in figures 1 to 3. 
The aim of this section is to identify the factors that cause heterogeneity in estimates reported 
within and between studies. Estimates will differ because of differences in samples (different 
industries,  countries  and  time  periods),  differences  in  the  measurement  of  key  variables, 
differences in econometric specification, and they will also differ because of sampling error. 
To model these features, we use a standard MRA model:  
 
ij ijn n ijk k ij u K X r        0          (1) 
 
where  rij  is  the  i
th  comparable  partial  correlation  (or,  alternatively,  the  marginal  effect) 
derived  from  the  j
th  study,  β0  is  the  constant,  the  Xs  are  dummy  variables  representing 
characteristics associated with the j
th study, the Ks are continuous variables associated with 
the j
th study, γk and δn are the unknown regression coefficients, and ui is the disturbance term 
(Stanley and Jarrell 1989). The X and K variables quantify the effect of key study differences 
on  reported  union  effects.    While  the  X  and  K  variables  will  in  the  main  come  from 
information drawn from within the econometric studies included in the MRA, they can also 
include information that is exogenous to the studies. For example, below we consider the 
degree to which labor markets were regulated at the time that the samples were taken. This 
enables us to model potential sources of between-study variation that were not available to 
the authors of the primary studies. 
The MRA model was initially applied by Stanley and Jarrell (1989), and is gaining 
widespread use among economists. Recent examples include Görg and Strobl (2001), Jarrell 
and Stanley (2004), Dobson et al. (2006), and Disdier and Head (2008). The meta-regression 
model has been developed to analyze the multi-dimensional nature of the research process 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 1989; and Stanley 2001). The MRA of equation 1 helps to quantify the   16
effect of differences in data, specification, measurement, and estimation on reported union 
effects. Some of these differences are due to economic factors, such as differences between 
countries and over time, while others are due to research design, such as differences in the 
econometric specification. 
 
5.1   Explanatory variables 
We  included 26 potential  explanatory  variables  in the MRA. First, we considered 
eight variables that capture key data differences. Three of these relate to country differences: 
UK, Germany, and Canada are binary variables taking the value of 1 if the estimates relate 
respectively to the UK, Germany, and Canada, with the US used as the base. These dummies 
provide a test for cross-country differences in the U-I effect.
19 
Industry Level  is a binary  variable taking the value of 1  if the estimates relate to 
industry-level innovation data and 0 if they relate to firm/establishment-level data. The use of 
industry as the unit of analysis can lead to problems of aggregation bias and it is arguably 
preferable to use firm-level data. Moreover, decisions affecting innovation are made at the 
firm level and therefore are more likely to be affected by union activities at the firm level 
rather than by those at the industry level. Services is another binary variable taking the value 
of 1 if the estimates relate purely to services industries (with manufacturing as the base). 
Various is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the estimates relate to data for several 
industries  (again  with  manufacturing  as  the  base).  These  variables  are  included  to  test 
whether the effect of unions on innovations varies across industry sectors as suggested by 
some studies (Hirsch, 1990; 1991; 1992). Panel is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if 
panel data are used (with cross-sectional data as the base). Cross-sectional data are more 
likely  to  capture  long-run  effects,  while  panel  data  capture  transitional  (medium-term) 
                                                 
19  Table  1  reported  the  MRA  with  just  country  dummies.  Table  2  extends  this  to  include  several  control 
variables.   17
effects.  Average  Year  is  a  continuous  variable  representing  the  average  year  of  the  data 
sample used in studies. This variable is included to capture any time patterns in the partial 
correlations. 
Second, we consider six variables for measurement differences. Industry Union is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 if industry-level union density is used (with firm level 
unionization as the base).
20 Union Dummy is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a union 
dummy is used (with a firm level union density as the base). RD Level and Innovations are 
binary variables taking the value of 1 if the dependent variable is measured as the dollar value 
of R&D and the number of innovations, respectively, with R&D/sales as the base. These 
variables capture different dimensions of innovation. The most widely used measure is the 
R&D ratio.  
Third, we consider twelve variables that reflect differences in control variables: Firm 
Size,  Profitability,  Concentration,  Market  Share,  Firm’s  Age,  Wages,  Advertising,  Skills, 
Industry Dummies, Growth, High-Tech Firm, and Time Trend. These are all binary variables 
taking the value of 1 if these variables were included as part of the econometric specification. 
For  example,  human  capital  (Skills)  may  be  an  important  control  variable.  Some  studies 
suggest  that  trade  unions  in  high-skilled  firms  are  less  likely  to  challenge  technological 
change  because skilled workers are  less likely to be affected by the resulting change, as 
workers are less likely to fear losing their jobs. Likewise, profits (Profitability) are important 
as  they  provide  a  major  source  for  the  financing  of  investments.  Hence,  profits  should 
arguably be included in a well specified primary regression.
21 Finally, Non-OLS is included 
to capture the effect of different estimators, with OLS as the base.  
                                                 
20  There  is  some  collinearity  between  Industry  Union  and  Industry  Level,  with  a  first  order  correlation 
coefficient of 0.57. 
21 There is, however, an argument for not including profits in innovation regressions. Odgers and Betts (1997) 
found that removing profits from their econometric model increases U-I. This is because unions decrease profits.   18
The  effect  of  unions  on  innovation  can  depend  on  the  institutional  structure  of 
collective bargaining, as well as the nature of the industrial relations system. In countries 
such as Germany, unions and  employers regard each other as partners. Such cooperative 
industrial relations may facilitate technological progress and innovation. That is, the outcome 
of union rent seeking need not always be inefficient for both unions and firms. As Schnabel 
and  Wagner  (1992a:  370)  argue:  “Firms  and  unions  could  be  better  off  by  agreeing  to 
maximize the size of the pie and then bargaining over the division of the pie (…) In other 
words,  efficient  bargaining  would  entail  no  real  effect  of  unions  on  firms’  investment 
activities”.  We use two variables to capture differences in bargaining and industrial relations.  
First,  we  used  data  on  the  degree  to  which  collective  bargaining  is  centralized, 
Central  Wage.  These  data  are  reported  by  the  Fraser  Institute  as  a  component  of  their 
measure  of  economic  freedom.
22  Second,  we  use  a  measure  of  overall  labor  market 
regulation, Labor Regulation, again reported by the Fraser Institute. This index is constructed 
by taking into account the existence and size of the minimum wage, the degree of hiring and 
firing regulation, the degree of centralization of collective bargaining, and mandated cost of 
hiring and firing. Labor Regulation serves as a proxy to which labor markets deviate from the 
competitive labor market model. Both series range from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most 
liberal (economically free).
23  
It is important to note that the individual econometric studies included in the dataset 
do not consider the effects of labor market regulation on the U-I effect. One of the benefits of 
                                                                                                                                                  
So, including profits picks up only part of the effects of unions. At the same time, not including profits means 
that the equation may become mis-specified. MRA enables us to quantify the effect of including profits in the 
econometric specification.  
22 http://www.freetheworld.com/index.html.  
23 The Labor Regulation series varies both within and between countries over time. The average value of Labor 
Regulation is 7.22, 6.90, 7.24, and 3.36 for the US, the UK, Canada, and Germany, respectively, while the 
standard deviation is 0.53, 0.12, 0.04, and 0.06, respectively.   19
MRA is that it is able to consider factors that were not, or could not, be considered by the 
original econometric studies, in our case the degree of labor market liberalization. By pooling 
the estimates from different studies and collecting data on labor market regulation, we can 
explore  the  links  between  these  two  series.  Data  on  labor  market  regulation,  collective 
bargaining and the time trends in U-I can be regarded as information that is exogenous to the 
individual studies.
24 
The  multivariate  MRA  results  are  presented  in  Table  2.
25  We  use  clustered  data 
analysis  to  adjust  standard  errors  for  data  dependence  arising  from  multiple  estimates 
reporting within studies. Since all observations are weighted by precision, estimation is by 
weighted least squares.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Column 1 presents the results of applying a general-to-specific  modeling strategy, 
whereby we commenced with all 26 potential  moderating variables and then sequentially 
eliminated any that were not statistically significant at least at the 10% level of significance.
26 
Of the 26 variables, 15 were found to be statistically significant in explaining heterogeneity 
in the reported U-I effects.  
For sensitivity analysis only, in column 2 we remove any study to which Hirsch was 
an author or co-author. One reason for checking the sensitivity of the results with respect to 
the Hirsch studies is that they use a relatively larger sample than most of the other studies, 
                                                 
24 While the years of data used can be an endogenous modelling choice, general trends in U-I are exogenous to 
the individual study. 
25 The standard error (SE) of the partial correlation was also included in the MRA in order to capture any 
selection effects. While statistically significant, the coefficient is less than 1, indicating the existence of only a 
small degree of selection bias. 
26 For the sake of brevity, the results for the general model are not reported here. These results are available 
from the authors.    20
and this might affect the results. Most of the results are not affected by the inclusion of the 
Hirsch group of studies. Moreover, there is no valid theoretical reason to exclude them from 
the  dataset.  In  column  3  we  use  only  those  estimates  that  use  R&D  as  a  measure  of 
innovation, removing any estimates using measures such as the number of innovations and 
patents data. In column 4 we rerun the MRA after removing the largest 5% and smallest 5% 
correlations. Finally, in column 5 we use robust regression to estimate the MRA.  While this 
offers MRA coefficient estimates robust to outliers, this comes at the cost of having standard 
errors that are not corrected for data clustering, and individual data points (estimates from 
individual studies included in the MRA) assigned equal weights, instead of using precision. 
As can be seen from Table 2, most of the results are robust, expect for the variables that 
capture specification differences.  
The preferred results are presented in column 1, and the discussion below revolves 
around these results. In these estimates, the constant is an estimate of the effects of unions on 
innovation in the US, using cross-sectional data, with firm level innovation and unionization 
data, with investments measured as R&D as a ratio of sales, estimated using OLS. The MRA 
does a very good job at explaining the variation in estimates, accounting for 68% of the 
variation (see the adjusted R-squared, column 1, Table 2). The remaining variation can be 




5.2  Time effects 
The coefficient for Average Year is positive indicating that the size of the adverse 
union effect is declining over time. The MRA reported in Table 2 controls for all the main 
differences  between  estimates  and  between  studies.  Hence,  the time  series  pattern  in  the   21
partial  correlations  is  unlikely  to  be  an  outcome  of  the  way  that  partial  correlations  are 
calculated.
27 The time trend exists for all countries, though it is much more pronounced for 
non-US  estimates:  Regressing  the  partial  correlations  on  Average  Year  for  just  the  US 
estimates gives a coefficient of +0.010 (t-statistic = 2.79), whilst for non-US estimates it 
gives a coefficient of +0.028 (t-statistic = 3.53). In his own extensive analysis, Hirsch (1992) 
found no evidence of time variation in U-I. In contrast, our MRA finds a significant pattern, 
though a weaker one for the US. 
One explanation for this trend is that it reflects structural change, with the adverse U-I 
effect getting smaller over time, perhaps because of the changing nature of bargaining. The 
trend could, for example, be driven by the weakening of union strength over time: Weaker 
unions could have smaller adverse effects on innovation. Further, union preferences might 
have changed over time, and/or the nature of contracts might have changed over time, with 
unions and employers negotiating not just over wages, but also bargaining over employment 
and, possibly, over innovation, so that these are all determined simultaneously. This might be 
related  to  declining  union  strength  and  increased  competitive  pressure  from  other  (non-
unionized) domestic firms and foreign competitors. If there has been a progressive shift away 
from non-cooperative bargaining, towards a more cooperative one, then this will lead to the 
observed  time  series  pattern.  An  alternative  explanation  might  be  that  Average  Year  is 
correlated with a variable not included in the MRA. We have, however, tried to consider all 
factors relevant in the MRA modeling.  
 
5.3  Country Effects and Labor Regulation 
None of the three non-US dummies, (Canada, Germany, and the UK) are statistically 
significant in the general-to-specific model (column 1, Table 2). This means that the U-I 
                                                 
27 If Average Year is replaced by the actual year of publication, we get a similar positive trend: +0.008, with a t-
statistic of 3.30.   22
effect in these countries does not differ from the US, once all other aspects of the research 
process are considered. The base in the MRA is the US, so that the constant in the MRA 
measures the U-I effect for the US. Since the non-US country dummies are not different to 
the US effect, the MRA suggests that unions have an adverse effect on innovation in all 
countries included in the dataset. Note the contrast with the results presented in Table 1, 
where  other  aspects  of  research  design  were  not  modeled.  Simply  taking  an  average  of 
reported estimates gives the appearance of a positive U-I effect for Germany and a near zero 
effect  for  the  UK.  However,  once  data,  measurement  and  specification  differences  are 
modeled, we find that U-I is negative in all countries. 
Panel B of Table 2 adds the three country dummies back into the general-to-specific 
version  of  the  MRA  (the  variables  initially  drop  out  as  part  of  the  general-to-specific 
modeling strategy). All three country dummies have a negative coefficient, but they are not 
statistically  significantly.
28  Hence,  the  MRA  (column  1  of  Table  2)  suggests  that  after 
controlling for the various differences in the way studies were constructed and holding time 
and country-specific regulatory differences constant, unions  have  an adverse effect  in all 
countries studied - the US, the UK, Canada, Germany.  
While the country dummies are not statistically significant, the MRA indicates that 
regulatory differences modify the size of the U-I effect. The negative coefficient on Labor 
Regulation in column 1 indicates that the more liberal are labor markets, the more adverse is 
the effect of unions.
29 This is an interesting finding to emerge from the MRA. Flexible labor 
markets improve the allocation of labor. However, the results presented here indicate that 
labor market flexibility comes at a cost in terms of increasing union resistance to innovation. 
To  see  this,  consider  that  the  average  value  of  Labor  Regulation  was  7.22  for  the  US, 
compared to 3.36 for Germany. This means that, ceteris paribus, labor market flexibility adds 
                                                 
28 The two exceptions are Germany in columns 3 and 5, where it has a larger negative effect than the US. 
29 If country and Labor Regulation interactions are added, they are not statistically significant.    23
-0.07 to the negative U-I partial correlation for the US (7.22*-0.01) compared to only -0.03 
for Germany (3.36*-0.01).  Hence, ignoring all other factors, the MRA estimates that U-I in 
the US is -0.24 (-0.17-0.07) compared to -0.20 in Germany (-0.17-0.03). These results stand 
in sharp contrast to what many expect regarding the effects of labor market regulations (see 
for example the opening quote to this paper from Alesina and Zeira, 2006). 
The associations between average year and the reported U-I effects and labor market 
regulation and the reported U-I effects are illustrated in figures 4 and 5, respectively. The 
associated  partial  regression  plots  from  the  MRA  are  presented  in  figures  6  and  7, 
respectively. In order to ensure that the results are not driven by a small number of potentially 
relatively large partial correlations, the MRA was re-estimated after removing the smallest 
and largest partial correlations (see Table 2, column 4). The results remain unchanged, as can 
be seen by the associated partial regression plots (Figures 8 and 9). 
 





Schnabel  and  Wagner  (1994,  p.  493)  note  that:  “Efficient  bargaining  and  the 
cooperative behavior it entails depend on the legal framework, the institutional structure of 
collective bargaining, the design of negotiated contracts, and the style of industrial relations.” 
They argue that adversarial industrial relations (such as those found in the US and UK) are 
more likely to result in adverse effects on innovation, than cooperative ones (countries such 
as Germany).  The variable Labor Regulation, however, reflects more than just collective 
bargaining differences: It includes the minimum wage and regulations over hiring and firing. 
We replaced Labor Regulation with a variable that focuses purely on collective bargaining 
(Central Wage), but this was not statistically significant. We also used a series on the degree   24
of  bargaining  coordination  (see  Flanagan,  1999).  This  variable  is  also  not  statistically 
significant.  
Labor  Regulation  is  actually  very  highly  correlated  with  Germany  (first  order 
correlation of -0.93).
30 Unfortunately, we are unable to find a suitable instrument to redress 
this correlation. Table 3 explores the sensitivity of the MRA results by comparing the results 
from Tables 1 and 2, to some additional meta-regressions.
31 Each row reports two sets of 
results. The first set of entries reports the key regression coefficients from the MRA. The 
second set of entries reports the average effect on R&D, evaluated by considering the degree 
of labor regulation and the average year of the data used for the individual country samples. 
The Labor Regulation variable is omitted in row 3 and Average Year is also omitted in the 
results reported in row 4. Rows 5 and 6 repeat the MRA reported in rows 3 and 4, but this 
time with country dummies added as explanatory variables.
32 Row 6 effectively repeats the 
results from Table 1 but with the addition of the MRA control variables listed in Table 2 
(Industry Level, etc.) In row 7 we report the MRA after removing all observations relating to 
Germany. The results from Table 3 confirm that regardless of the specification, the effect of 
unions on R&D is negative, in all countries. This table also indicates that the results for 
Labor Regulation are not driven by the inclusion of German data (see column 7 Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
30  Of  the  four  countries  in  the  dataset,  Germany  has  the highest  degree  of  labor  market regulation.  Labor 
Regulation is not correlated with UK (correlation = 0.06) nor Canada (correlation = 0.11), but it does have a 
moderate degree of correlation with USA (correlation = 0.43).  
31 Recall that Table 1 reports the unconditional averages predicted by MRA, while tables 2 and 3 report the 
conditional averages. 
32 Recall that these variables drop out of the MRA when a general-to-specific strategy is pursued, meaning that 
there is no statistical difference between the U-I effect in the US and the other countries.    25
The possibility that labor market regulation might moderate the effect of unions has received 
little attention in the literature. The effect of labor market regulation on innovation is itself 
theoretically ambiguous.
33 The effect of labor market regulation on the U-I effect is likewise 
ambiguous:  Several  opposing  effects  might  operate,  so  that  the  net  effect  remains  an 
empirical issue.  
On the one hand, labor market deregulation can be expected to stimulate innovate. 
Deregulation benefits firms by increasing flexibility and reducing labor and production cost. 
Labor  market  deregulation  is  also  likely  to  decrease  unemployment  thereby  benefiting 
‘outsiders’.
34  Greater  labor  market  deregulation  should  increase  incentives  to  innovate, 
especially where technological change requires labor adjustment. Technological change that 
creates  opposition  from  insiders  might  be  easier  to  implement  when  labor  markets  are 
flexible. Also, flexible labor markets might limit the extent to which unions can capture rents 
arising from technology. 
On the other hand, labor market regulation might stimulate innovation through several 
channels: 
 
(a) Higher labor cost: Tighter labor market regulations are likely to strengthen the position 
and  bargaining power of  insiders,  increasing their wages. Higher  labor costs increase the 
incentives to increase capital intensity, replacing labor with capital. Alesina and Zeira (2006) 
extend this line of argument by arguing that labor regulation in Europe keeps wage inequality 
                                                 
33 Labor market deregulation does not actually mean that industrial relations become completely unregulated. 
Rather, the idea behind ‘deregulation’ is that regulations emphasize internal sources, e.g. managers are given 
either  unilateral  say  within  a  workplace  over  key  decisions  affecting  employees,  or  in  consultation  with 
employees.  In  contrast,  ‘regulation’  means  that  at  least  some  key  decisions  are  made  externally  to  the 
organization. 
34 Technological shocks might create unemployment when generous welfare state provisions (that often co-exist 
with labor market regulation) make displaced workers prefer unemployment.   26
low,  creating  incentives  for  firms:  “to  develop  and  adopt  labor  saving  capital-intensive 
technologies at the low end of the skill distribution. At the same time technical change in the 
US has  been  more  skill  biased than  in Europe, since  American  skilled wages  have  been 
higher” (2006, p. 3).  
 
(b) Firm’s bargaining power: Innovation improves productivity, increases profits and make 
new capital more attractive. It might also increase a firm’s bargaining power, enabling it to 
capture a greater share of available rents. Labor market regulations might ‘shock’ firms into 
investing in technological change that actually shifts bargaining power in their favour. 
 
(c)  Motivation  effect:  Storm  and  Naastepad  (2009)  argue  that  regulations  might  increase 
innovation if they increase worker motivation and commitment to the firm, making it easier 
to introduce labor-saving technical change. That is, regulations might increase the likelihood 
that labor will cooperate with management. Labor deregulation might even worsen industrial 
conflict, especially if it lowers wages. Consistent with this argument, Storm and Naastepad 
(2009) find that for OECD countries, labor market regulation increased productivity growth.  
Francois and Roberts (2003) argue that the more regulated European labor markets might 
enable firms to extract work effort at a lower cost, compared to US type labor markets.
35  
 
(d) Rent seeking: By creating frictions that restrict firing (and hiring), unions might have 
greater opportunities to extract rents from firms. They may thus encourage firms to innovate, 
so that they can subsequently extract rents from the investments. This effect would, at best, 
occur only in the short term. 
                                                 
35 Francois and Roberts (2003) argue that while firms operating in highly regulated labor markets face higher 
hiring and firing costs, they also enjoy lower costs of extracting effort. Thus, the net effect on incentives to 
innovate is unclear.   27
 
 
5.4  Measurement, Data, and Econometric Specification Differences 
The  MRA  results  indicate  that  data  differences  are  a  robust  determinant  of 
heterogeneity  in reported U-I effects. The use of  industry  level  innovation data (Industry 
Level) produces larger adverse effects, compared to firm level data (increases the negative 
partial correlation by 0.19, on average). That is, the adverse effects of unions are magnified at 
the industry level. This result might be an outcome of aggregation bias. However, it could 
also reflect negative externalities, as the adverse effects spillover from one firm unto another. 
In contrast, the use of industry level unionization data (Industry Union) results in smaller 
adverse effects compared to firm level union data. This appears to be inconsistent with the 
idea of a non-monotonic relationship between unions and technology discussed in section 2 
above (Dowrick and Spencer, 1994), although there is not a strong association between the 
use of industry level union data and industry unions. Measuring unionization as a binary 
variable (Union Dummy), instead of a more informative continuous variable (typically union 
density) also results in smaller adverse U-I effects.  
The MRA did not detect any industry differences in U-I effects: The two industry 
dummies  (Services  and  Various)  were  not  statistically  significant,  indicating  that the  U-I 
effect in these industries does not differ from manufacturing. 
The  measurement of  innovation  is  important. Compared to R&D  based  measures, 
studies that use innovations data (e.g number of patents and number of innovations) find 
much  smaller  adverse  effects  (Innovation).  That  is,  using  R&D  data  (investment  flows) 
results  in  larger  adverse  U-I  effects,  compared  to  measures  of  actual  innovation.  This   28
indicates that while unions depress investment in R&D (an indicator of innovation), actual 
innovation is not as adversely affected.
36 
The MRA shows that econometric specification differences are important, though the 
results are not always robust (compare columns 1 through to 5). Controlling for the firm’s 
age, advertising, and wages all result in larger negative U-I effects.  For example, studies that 
include the firm’s age in the primary regression find, on average, a 0.06 larger negative U-I 
effect than those that do not. In contrast, the inclusion of industry dummies, a time trend, 
market share, human capital (skills), and profitability in the econometric specification are 
also important, resulting in smaller adverse effects.
37 For example, studies that include human 
capital in the primary regression find, on average, a 0.07 smaller negative U-I effect than 
those that do not. 
Several variables did not appear to be important in explaining the differences between 
estimates.  Controlling  for  industry  concentration,  firm  size,  industry  dummies,  the  firm’s 
growth, and whether a firm is a high-tech firm, all make no difference to the reported U-I 
estimates. The MRA also suggests that there is no difference in U-I estimates from cross-
sectional and panel data. Further, estimator does not appear to matter once other dimensions 
of  research  are  considered:  Estimates  derived  from  OLS  are  essential  the  same  as  those 
derived from other estimators. It is not the estimator but the data that affects estimates of U-I. 
 
                                                 
36 We rerun the MRA using country dummies interacted with Innovation, to test whether there are country 
differences  with  respect  to  innovation  counts.  None  of  the  interactions  were  statistically  significant,  either 
individually or jointly (Wald test = 0.49, p-value = 0.62).  
37 Note that the time trend referred to here is a time trend in the primary regression model capturing trends in 
intangible capital formation. It is not a measure of a time trend in the union effect: This is captured by Average 
Year in the MRA. The only other variable that is statistically significant is Book Chapters. Studies published as 
book chapters tend to report much smaller adverse effects.   29
5.5  Robustness 
For sensitivity analysis, we re-estimated column 1 (of Table 2) using author ids to 
cluster the observations, instead of using study ids. The results are essentially unchanged. 
Also  in  unreported  regressions,  we  explored  the  effects  of  other  variables.  First,  we 
considered  the  effects  of  trade  liberalization.  Lommersund  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that trade 
liberalization  might  increase  resistance  to  technology,  if  it  reduces  the  elasticity  of  the 
demand for labor. As a proxy for trade liberalization, we use the Freedom House’s index of 
Freedom to Trade Internationally.
38 This was never statistically significant, suggesting that 
for  the  industries  and  time  periods  examined,  economic  openness  was  not  an  important 
influence on the size of the U-I effect.  
Dowrick and Spencer (1994), argue that the existence of unemployment insurance 
might make unions more willing to accept technological change. To explore this, we use 
three alternative measures. First, we included transfers and subsidies as a percent of GDP in 
the MRA. Second, we included the per capita value of social public expenditures (including 
unemployment compensation and health care) expressed in constant prices PPP (in 2000 US 
prices). Third, we included social public expenditures as a percent of GDP.
39 We found no 
link between these proxies of welfare state provisions and the size of the U-I effect. It appears 
that it is not welfare provisions that shape U-I. Rather, it is the combined effect of hiring and 
firing  regulations,  minimum  wages,  and  collective  bargaining  that  moderates  union’s 
response to investment in new technology. 
 
                                                 
38 This is component Area 4b of the index. The series ranges from 1 to 10. 
39 The data on transfers comes from The World Bank, while the data on social public expenditures comes from 
the OECD.   30
5.6   Technology adoption (the U-A effect) 
With only nine studies and 51 estimates with marginal effects, we are unable to estimate an 
MRA  with  the  same  number  of  variables  as  the  MRA  for  the  U-I  effect.  Instead,  we 
considered an MRA with the effects of regulations, time, and country differences.
40 Only two 
variables emerge to be statistically significant. We find that Labor Regulation has a negative 
coefficient  (-0.05,  t=-1.90),  confirming  the  results  for  U-I  effects:  Unions  operating  in 
countries with  more  flexible  labor markets are more  likely to resist the adoption of  new 
technology. We also found a larger negative marginal effect in Australia, compared to the US 
(-0.11,  t=-1.87).  No  difference  was  detected  between  the  UK  and  the  US  in  terms  of 
technology  adoption  (0.04,  t=0.84).
41  Finally,  in  contrast to the  U-I  effect, there  was  no 
noticeable pattern in union resistance to technology adoption over time (-0.011, t=-0.30). 
 
 
5.7  Size of effect 
 
How large is the effect of unions on innovation? Our key measure of effect has been the 
partial correlation. When assessing the effect of a first order correlation, most authors use 
Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, and these have been used also for partial correlations. According 
to Cohen, a correlation of 0.2 is a small effect, 0.50 is a medium effect and anything larger 
than  0.8  is  large.  However,  partial  correlations  can  be  larger  or  smaller  than  first  order 
correlations. Doucouliagos (2010) derives guidelines for partial correlations, showing that: a 
partial correlation less than 0.02 is trivial; less than 0.07 is small; less than 0.16 is medium; 
and greater than 0.30 is large.  
  According to the MRA reported in Table 2, the effects of unions on innovation vary 
depending on the measures of innovation and unionization used. When firm level data are 
                                                 
40 This is not as limiting as it might seem. All the U-A estimates are derived from firm level innovation and 
unionization data, so that there is no issue here regarding firm versus industry level data.  
41 We had no observations for Germany for which we could calculate marginal effects and their standard errors.   31
used and innovation is measured as R&D, the U-I partial correlation for the US is estimated 
to be -0.22, rising to -0.34 when industry level data are used.
42 If the measure of innovation is 
actual innovation counts instead of R&D, the U-I partial correlation for the US is estimated to 
be -0.08, rising to -0.20 when industry level data are used. This means that the effect of 
unions on R&D in the US is moderate to large and is economically significant, while the 
effect on the number of innovations is small to medium.  
  For a sub-set of 128 estimates we were able to calculate elasticities (the percentage 
change in innovation resulting from a one percentage change in unionization). Evaluated at 
the sample means, we find that unionization has directly reduced innovation by about 7%. 




6.  Other determinants of innovation 
 
The partial correlations measure the union effect, holding all other factors constant. It is also 
of  some  interest  to  investigate  what  other  (non-union)  determinants  of  innovation  are 
established in this literature, and to compare the size of their effects. Our analysis of the 
effects of unions was based on a systematic review of all the evidence. That is, we compiled a 
population of the available estimates. Since the main focus in this paper is on unions, we have 
not  undertaken  a  similar  systematic  search  for  all  studies  that  report  estimates  for  other 
determinants  of  innovation.  Hence,  we  are  unable  to offer  a  systematic  review  of  these. 
However, we are able to provide a partial review of the relevant literature.  
The  partial  review  is  conducted  on  only  those  estimates  of  other  determinants  of 
innovation that are published as part of the U-I effect literature. That is, we include here only 
                                                 
42 For these calculations we use the sample averages for average year and labor market regulation, we assume 
that unionization is measured as a continuous variable and that the econometric model includes all the variables 
identified as significant by the MRA in column 1 of Table 2. 
43 We were able to calculate 72 elasticities for the US which have an average value of -6.4, and 56 elasticities 
for the rest of the world which have an average value of -8.4.   32
those estimates of the determinants of  innovation that are reported in the 38 studies that 
investigate the U-I effect. Those studies that did not investigate the effects of unions are, 
obviously, not included in our sample. Hence, the results presented in Table 4, should be 
considered  in  this  light.  For  example,  Comin  and  Hobijn  (2004)  find  that  cross-country 
differences in technology adoption are driven by income, human capital, and openness. They 
find that two institutional variables are also important (executive and legislative power) but 
they do not explore the effects of industrial relations.  
We collected information on six other determinants of technological change: human 
capital, industry concentration, firm size, growth, profitability, and physical capital. Table 4 
reports  the  direct  effect  of  these  six  non-union  determinants  of  innovation.  Both  human 
capital  and  industry  concentration  are  negatively  correlated  with  innovation.  Firm  size, 
growth, profitability and physical capital all have a positive effect on innovation.  
Firm size has the largest positive effect on innovation: Larger firms invest more in 
innovation. Growth is more important than profitability, while physical capital has a smaller 
effect.  Table  4  indicates  that  physical  capital  and  intangible  capital  (innovation)  are 
complements  in  the  production  process,  while  human  capital  and  intangible  capital  are 
substitutes.
44 
It is interesting to compare the size of these effects with the size of the effect of 
unions. The size of the unconditional U-I effect in the US (-0.14, column 2, Table 1)  is 
greater than the adverse effect on innovation arising from human capital (-0.10, column 1, 
Table 4)  and  industry concentration (-0.08, column 2, Table 4). The  MRA suggests that 
                                                 
44 We expected to find complementarity between innovation and human capital. The negative correlation with 
human capital might simply be a specific result found by the group of  studies under review, rather than a 
universal effect: Only of full meta-analysis of the entire literature on the effects of human capital on innovation 
can uncover the real relationship between the two. The result is, however, consistent with vintage human capital 
theories, where firm specific human capital accumulates for a specific vintage of capital, reducing the incentive 
to adopt new technology (Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996; Comin and Hobijn, 2004).   33
market  power reduces  the  incentive  to innovate,  but  this  is  smaller  than  the  effect  from 
unions. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
6.1  Indirect Effects 
Table 4 can be used to identify some of the indirect effects of unions on innovation. Table 4 
shows that profitability has a direct positive effect on innovation, with a partial correlation of 
about +0.13.
45 Doucouliagos and Laroche (2009) found that, on average, US unions had a 
negative  effect  on  profits,  with  an  average  partial  correlation  of  -0.09.   This  means  that 
unions have an indirect negative effect on innovation working through their adverse effect on 
profitability of -0.012  ) 09 . 0 13 . 0 (    . Similarly, Table 4 shows that the direct effect of 
physical capital on innovation is +0.05. Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003) found that unions 
had a negative effect on physical capital, with an average partial correlation of -0.08. This 
means  that  unions  have  an  indirect  negative  effect  on  innovation  working  through  their 
adverse effect on physical capital, of -0.004  ) 08 . 0 05 . 0 (    . These two indirect effects are 
small, adding about -0.02 to the direct U-I effect.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper provides a systematic review of the econometric evidence on the effects of unions 
on innovation and technology adoption. We apply meta-regression analysis to 208 estimates 
reported in 29 technology impact studies and 51 estimates from nine technology adoption 
studies. We draw five robust conclusions from these data. 
                                                 
45 There is a causality issue here, as higher profits enable more investment to be financed and investing in new 
capital increases future profits.   34
First, when the existing estimates are scrutinized using meta-regression analysis, we 
find  that  there  is  in  fact  little  disagreement  between  studies.  All  the  available  evidence 
indicates that unions depress the level of innovation and they also depress the adoption of 
technology.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  both  the  tax  on  capital  and  labor  monopoly 
theories of union behavior (outlined in section 2), which appear to dominate any collective 
voice  effects.  Unions  have  a  more  depressing  effect  on  R&D  then  they  do  on  actual 
innovations.  
Second, country differences in the degree to which unions impact upon technology 
are driven largely by the degree of labor market regulation. Holding labor market regulation 
constant, unions have an adverse effect on investment in all countries of a similar magnitude. 
However,  industrial  relations  and  regulatory  regimes  differ  between  countries,  and  these 
differences matter for technology outcomes. More regulated labor markets experience less 
union  resistance  to  technology.  Consequently,  unions  have  a  larger  negative  effect  on 
innovation in the US and Canada, then they do in Germany. 
Third, the U-I effect has been declining over time in all countries, though this trend is 
less pronounced in the case of the US. This could reflect change in the nature of bargaining 
processes. 
Fourth, the size of the direct effect of unions on technology in the US is much larger 
than the effect of unions on profits and the effect on physical capital: Unions have a more 
noticeable adverse effect on innovation. Further, by depressing profits and physical capital, 
unions have a small second round, or indirect, effect on innovation. 
   Fifth, MRA shows that most of the variation in reported estimates can be explained 
by differences in the data used (firm versus industry), the measurement of technology (R&D 
versus  patents)  and  the  econometric  specification.  MRA  quantifies  the  effect  of  these 
differences.   35
The  meta-regression  analysis  indicates  that  unions  affect  both  infra-marginal  and 
marginal decisions: They affect the decision to adopt technology and how much innovation is 
undertaken. Many econometric studies have been carried out ignoring the effects of industrial 
relations  on  technology.  Such  studies  might  very  well  be  mis-specified,  as  the  evidence 
indicates that industrial relations do matter.  
  The meta-analysis presented here focused only on econometric studies. There exists a 
very large number of case studies on the effects of unions on technology. Analysis of this 
vast literature using the tools of meta-analysis might also reveal important insights on the 
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Table 1: Average Union Effects, 
Innovation and Technology Adoption 
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Notes: N denotes the number of estimates and K denotes the number of studies. Columns 1 and 3 report 
averages using data for each country separately. Columns 2 and 4 combine all data and use country dummy 
variables, so that the total effect is calculated relatively to the base (the US). The MRA in columns 2 and 4 
includes also the partial correlations’ standard error and the marginal effects’ inverse of square root of the 
sample size, respectively. Figures in brackets are t-statistics using clustered data analysis to correct for any 
data  dependence  arising  from  the  inclusion  of  several  estimates  per  study.  **,  ***  indicates  statistical 
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Table 2: Determinants of Heterogeneity in U-I effects 

























A.  General to Specific Models 
Constant (USA)  0.58 [0.50]  -0.17 (5.45)  -0.22 (5.24)  -0.15 (5.80)  -0.16 (5.34)  -0.14 (4.21) 
Data differences 
Industry Level  0.25 [0.43]  -0.19 (7.14)  -0.16 (7.80)  -0.20 (6.56)  -0.19 (6.76)  -0.21 (9.06) 
Industry Union  0.26 [0.44]  0.06 (2.89)  0.05 (2.82)  0.05 (2.15)  0.05 (2.76)  0.04 (2.28) 
Union Dummy  0.44 [0.50]  0.05 (5.14)  0.04 (2.75)  0.05 (4.28)  0.05 (5.03)  0.04 (2.08) 
Innovation   0.13 [0.34]  0.14 (6.99)  0.16 (6.76)  -  0.13 (5.41)  0.13 (5.32) 
Specification differences 
Profitability  0.32 [0.47]  0.01 (2.51)  0.01 (0.67)  0.01 (2.99)  0.01 (2.53)  0.02 (1.73) 
Human capital  0.15 [0.36]  0.07 (2.69)  -0.05 (1.39)  0.10 (6.65)  0.08 (3.33)  0.11 (5.31) 
Advertising  0.06 [0.23]  -0.11 (3.99)  -0.05 (1.03)  -0.16 (5.57)  -0.09 (3.05)  -0.08 (2.31) 
Market share  0.08 [0.27]  0.04 (1.91)  0.06 (4.03)  0.07 (3.51)  0.04 (1.50)  0.02 (0.72) 
Wages  0.40 [0.49]  -0.04 (1.74)  0.08 (2.22)  -0.07 (3.90)  -0.03 (1.28)  0.01 (0.32) 
Firm’s Age  0.40 [0.49]  -0.06 (3.09)  -0.01 (0.65)  -0.04 (2.12)  -0.06 (2.39)  -0.10 (4.22) 
Industry 
Dummies 
0.24 [0.43]  0.01 (2.55)  0.03 (2.74)  0.02 (1.97)  0.01 (0.86)  -0.01 (0.72) 
Time Trend  0.35 [0.48]  0.02 (2.87)  0.01 (0.23)  0.03 (4.46)  0.02 (2.85)  0.02 (1.18) 
Exogenous Data 
Average Year  19.80 [4.63]  0.01 (5.44)  0.01 (5.24)  0.01 (5.79)  0.01 (5.34)  0.01 (4.25) 
Labor Regulation  6.79 [1.17]  -0.01 (2.38)  0.01 (0.75)  0.01 (0.19)  -0.01 (3.45)  -0.03 (4.55) 
             
SE  0.07 [0.06]  0.80 (2.41)  0.75 (2.48)  0.98 (2.78)  0.83 (3.08)  0.51 (4.21) 
N    208  129  181  188  208 
K    25  21  18  25  25 
Adjusted R
2    0.68  0.71  0.38  0.80  - 
B.  Specific MRA Models With Country Dummies 
Canada  0.07 [0.26]  -0.02 (0.84)  -0.03 (1.85)  -0.03 (1.76)  -0.02 (0.92)  0.03 (1.14) 
Germany  0.09 [0.29]  -0.09 (1.30)  -0.09 (0.62)  -0.35 (5.31)  -0.03 (0.40)  -0.21 (2.13) 
UK  0.26 [0.44]  -0.01 (0.63)  -0.01 (0.12)  0.01 (0.13)  -0.01 (0.08)  -0.07 (2.09) 
Columns  1  to  4  estimated  by  weighted  least  squares,  using  precision  as  weights.  Column  5  uses  robust 
regression. Figures in round brackets are absolute values of t-statistics, using clustered data analysis to adjust 
standard errors. Bold indicates statistically significant at least at the 5% level. SE is the standard error of the 
individual U-I effects. N and K denote the total number of estimates and studies, respectively. Results in shaded 
cells are robust to alternative sub-samples. Panel B repeats the MRA models after adding back the country 
dummies. 
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Table 3: Country Differences in U-I Effects 
 

















(1.12)  -  - 
Average  




















 (5.27)  -  -  -  -  0.01  
(5.23) 
Average 





(6.42)  -  -  -  -  - 
Average 











 (0.84)  -  0.01 
 (3.59) 
Average 











 (0.60)  -  - 
Average 
R&D effect  -0.13  -0.07  -0.01  -0.13     
(7)  -0.18 





R&D effect  -0.19  -0.12  -  -0.18     
Estimation is by weighted least squares, using precision as weights. Figures in brackets are absolute values of t-
statistics, using clustered data analysis. Except for row 1, all rows include the same set of control variables as in 
Table 2.  Row 1 reproduces the results from Table 1, column 2. Row 2 reproduces the results from Table 2, 
column 2. All German data are excluded from the results reported in row 7. Average R&D effects are evaluated 
using country specific sample means for average year and labor market regulation. 
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Table 4: Non-Union Determinants of Innovation 
(Weighted average partial correlations) 
 































N  22  73  61  47  37  56 
K  8  18  14  8  10  13 
Notes: N and K denote the total number of estimates and studies, respectively. Figures in brackets are t-
statistics derived using standard errors that are robust to data clustering. These estimates are based on a partial 
meta-analysis of the data. **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. ns 
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Simple average = -0.12. Precision weighted average = -0.14. Continuous line located at the weighted average.   45
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Figure 4:  Average Year and U-I Effects                             Figure 5:  Regulation and U-I Effects 
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Figure 6: Partial Regression Plot, Average Year     Figure 7:  Partial Regression Plot, Regulation 
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Figure 8: Partial Regression Plot, Average Year     Figure 9:  Partial Regression Plot, Regulation 
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coef = -.01340517, (robust) se = .00388053, t = -3.45  47



















Acs & Audretsch (1987 &1988)  US  Number of innovations  247  -0.191*** 
Addison & Wagner (1994a & 1994b)  UK  R&D ratio  15  0.036 
Allen (1988)  US  R&D ratio  74  -0.376*** 
Audrecht & Schulenburg (1990)  US  Number of innovations  246  -0.185*** 
Betcherman (1991)  Canada  Expenditures on innovation  294  -0.047 
Betts, Odgers & Wilson (2001)  Canada  R&D ratio  247  -0.241*** 
Blumenfeld (2002)  US  R&D ratio  1,011  -0.070 
Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen  
(1999) 
UK  Number of innovations  4,125  0.050** 
Bronars & Deere (1993)  US  R&D ratio  660  -0.153*** 
Bronars, Deere & Tracy (1994)  US  R&D ratio  209  -0.069 
Connolly, Hirsch & Hirschey (1986)  US  R&D ratio  367  -0.137*** 
Fitzroy & Kraft (1990)  Germany  Innovation rate   57  -0.335** 
Geroski (1990)  UK  Number of innovations  73  -0.134 
Hirsch (1990)  US  R&D expenditure  2,692  -0.067*** 
Hirsch (1991)  US  R&D expenditure  4,327  -0.133*** 
Hirsch (1992)  US  R&D expenditure  4,176  -0.165*** 
Koeller (1996)  US  Number of innovations  246  -0.050 
Kraft, Stank and Dewenter (2009)  Germany  Number of innovations  2,062  0.064*** 
Menezes-Filho, Ulph & Van Reenen 
(1998a & 1998b) 
UK  R&D ratio   469  -0.037 
Nair-Reichert & Pomery (1999)  US  R&D ratio  419  -0.126*** 
Schnabel & Wagner (1992a & 1992b)  Germany  R&D ratio  27  0.023 
Schnabel & Wagner (1994)  Germany  R&D ratio  29  -0.060 
Schulenburg & Wagner (1990)  Germany 
and US 
Number of innovations   138  -0.070 
Taymaz (1991)  US  Innovation rate   42  -0.116 
Ulph & Ulph (1989)  UK  R&D/sales  33  -0.482** 
Technology adoption studies 
Drago and Wooden (1994)  Australia  Introduction of  technical 
change 
802  -0.07** 
Hirsch and Link (1987)  USA  Advantage in product-related  
technological innovation / 
Leader in developing 
innovative new product 
315  -0.14** 
Keefe (1991)  USA  Adoption of CADCAM, 




821  -0.02 
Latreille (1992)  UK  Using new technology  418  +0.17** 
Lintner, Pokorny, Woods & 
Blinkhorn (1987) 
UK  Adoption of CADCAM, 
CNC, NMT, etc. 
123  +0.02 
Machin and Wadhwani (1991)  UK  Introduction of conventional 
and advanced technical 
change 
  +0.07 
Michie and Sheehan (1999)  UK  Introduction of advanced 
technological change 
374  -0.07 
Michie and Sheehan (2003)  UK  Adoption of any product and 
process innovation 
242  +0.19 
Rogers (2004)  Australia  Innovator  920  -0.02 
         
Notes: 
1 Broad type of measure used. See studies for exact measures used. Some studies use several measures. 
**, *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
2 Average sample size and 
weighted average partial correlation are the averages of all estimates used, with precision used to weigh the 
individual correlations.  
3 The average marginal effect is reported for the technology adoption studies. The MRA 
uses the individual partial correlations and individual marginal effects. Bibliographic references are available 
from the authors.   48
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